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In his quite brilliant 1917 opinion in Masses Publishing Co v
Patten,' Judge Learned Hand set forth a novel interpretation of the
Espionage Act of 19172 that has had enormous impact on our under-
standing of the First Amendment. In crafting this opinion, Judge Hand
made clear that he was not holding the Act unconstitutional, but was
merely construing it against the background of our longstanding
commitment to the freedom of speech. Judge Hand adopted this ap-
proach in no small measure to deflect the vehemence of what he knew
would be a harshly negative reaction to his decision.
As a key step in his analysis, Judge Hand reasoned that-in light
of our history, values, and tradition-it would be unwarranted to at-
tribute to Congress an intention to enact a law that would have a
broadly suppressive effect on free speech without an unequivocal
statement of its purpose to that end. I have always assumed that this
was merely a ploy to enable Judge Hand to cast his opinion in terms
of statutory construction rather than constitutional compulsion, and
that is certainly the conventional wisdom.3 On examination, however,
it turns out, to my considerable surprise, that Judge Hand was right.
Congress did not intend the Espionage Act to have the severely re-
pressive effect attributed to it by the federal courts during World
War I. This was a judicial, rather than a legislative, development. This
sheds important new light not only on Judge Hand's opinion in
Masses, but also on our understanding of Congress, the courts, and
their respective roles in the evolution of one of the most repressive
periods of American history.
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1 244 F 535 (SD NY 1917), revd, 246 F 24 (2d Cir 1917).
2 40 Stat 217,219.
3 See, for example, David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years 265 (Cambridge
1997) ("[T]he legislative history of the Espionage Act, which Hand never cited in his opinion,
demonstrates the congressional intent to punish the very kind of antiwar material that prompted
the postmaster to declare The Masses 'nonmailable."').
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I. THE ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1917
For 120 years, from the expiration of the Sedition Act of 1798 un-
til our entry into World War I, the United States had no federal legis-
lation against seditious expression.' As the nation moved closer to en-
tering the war in Europe, however, Wilson administration officials in-
creasingly expressed concern that they "had no laws adequate to deal
with the insidious methods of internal hostile activities."5 Attorney
General Thomas Gregory argued that the government needed to de-
vise new ways to restrict "warfare by propaganda, 6 and as early as
1916, in his third annual message to Congress, President Wilson "cited
the need for legislation to suppress disloyal activities."7
The next day, the cabinet asked Attorney General Gregory to
prepare new legislation. The legislation, which was drafted by Assis-
tant Attorney General Charles Warren, was presented to Congress in
mid-1916, but was not acted upon until Congress declared war a year
later.8
The Espionage Act of 1917 was directed primarily toward such
matters as espionage and the protection of military secrets. Several
provisions, however, were relevant to the freedom of speech. Section 3
of Title I of the Act made it a crime, when the nation is at war, for any
person willfully to "make or convey false reports or false statements
with intent to interfere" with the military success of the United States
or "to promote the success of its enemies"; willfully to "cause or at-
tempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty,
in the military or naval forces of the United States"; or willfully to
"obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States."
Violations were punishable by prison sentences of up to twenty years.
The Act also authorized the Postmaster General to exclude from the
mails any writing or publication that is "in violation of any of the pro-
visions of this act" or that contains "any matter advocating or urging
4 See John Lord O'Brian, Civil Liberty in War Time, 42 Rep NY St Bar Assn 275, 279
(1919) ("[Tlhis country, prior to our entry into the war, had on the statute books almost no pro-
tection against hostile activities.").
5 John Lord O'Brian, New Encroachments on Individual Freedom, 66 Harv L Rev 1, 8
(1952). See also Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years at 249-50 (cited in note 3) (stating
that lawyers in the Department of Justice "became concerned that existing federal laws would be
insufficient" to prevent seditious behavior during wartime).
6 See Department of Justice, Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States
for the Year 1918 16-17 (GPO 1918).
7 Paul L. Murphy, World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States 53
(Norton 1979). See also Woodrow Wilson's Third Annual Message to Congress, quoted in David
M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society 24 (Oxford 1980).
8 See Murphy, World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties at 54-55 (cited in note 7)
(discussing how the espionage bill passed the Senate prior to the nation's entry into war but was
not voted on by the House until after).
9 Espionage Act of 1917,40 Stat at 219.
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treason, insurrection or forcible resistance to any law of the United
States."'°
John Lord O'Brian, the Head of the War Emergency Division of
the Department of Justice, observed shortly after the war ended that
"immense pressure" was "brought to bear throughout the war on the
Department of Justice in all parts of the country for indiscriminate
prosecution" of dissenters and for "wholesale repression and restraint
of public opinion."" It was, he added, in this "atmosphere" of passion,
patriotism, and clamor that the laws "affecting 'free speech' received
the severest test thus far placed upon them in our history."'2 The De-
partment of Justice invoked the Espionage Act of 1917 to prosecute
more than two thousand dissenters during the war for allegedly dis-
loyal, seditious, or incendiary speech."
The prevailing approach in the lower federal courts to interpret-
ing the Act is well-illustrated by the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Shaffer v United States." In
Shaffer, the defendant was charged with possessing and mailing copies
of a book, The Finished Mystery, in violation of the Act. The book con-
tained the following passage, which was specified in the indictment:
Standing opposite to these Satan has placed ... a certain delusion
which is best described by the word patriotism, but which is in
reality murder, the spirit of the very devil.... If you say it is a war
of defense against wanton and intolerable aggression, I must re-
ply that ... it has yet to be proved that Germany has any inten-
tion or desire of attacking us .... The war itself is wrong. Its
prosecution will be a crime. There is not a question raised, an is-
sue involved, a cause at stake, which is worth the life of one blue-
jacket on the sea or one khaki-coat in the trenches."
Shaffer was convicted, and the court of appeals affirmed, with the
following reasoning:
10 Id at 230.
11 O'Brian, 42 Rep NY St Bar Assn at 306 (cited in note 4).
12 Id at 299.
13 See Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years at 256 (cited in note 3) ("Of the ap-
proximately two thousand Espionage Act prosecutions, the overwhelming majority were brought
and won under title I, section 3."); Murphy, World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties at 80
(cited in note 7); Department of Justice, Annual Report of the Attorney General at 47 (cited in
note 6) ("The number of cases brought under [title I, section 3] exceeds the number of those
brought under any other of the war laws, except the selective-service act."). Approximately one
thousand individuals were convicted. Murphy, World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties at 80
(cited in note 7).
14 255 F 886 (9th Cir 1919).
15 id at 887.
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It is true that disapproval of the war and the advocacy of peace
are not crimes under the Espionage Act; but the question here ...
is whether the natural and probable tendency and effect of the
words ... are such as are calculated to produce the result con-
demned by the statute....
Printed matter may tend to obstruct the ... service even if it con-
tains no mention of recruiting or enlistment, and no reference to
the military service of the United States....
To teach that patriotism is murder and the spirit of the devil, and
that the war against Germany was wrong and its prosecution a
crime, is to weaken patriotism and the purpose to enlist or to
render military service in the war....
It is argued that the evidence fails to show that [Shaffer] commit-
ted the act willfully and intentionally. But ... [hie must be pre-
sumed to have intended the natural and probable consequences
of what he knowingly did.'6
This approach was embraced by almost every federal court that
interpreted the Espionage Act during the course of the war.17 Judges
routinely allowed juries to decide whether a defendant's speech vio-
lated the Act, and juries routinely returned a verdict of guilty.'8 Con-
sider the following:
16 Id at 888-89.
17 See, for example, Goldstein v United States, 258 F 908, 910-11 (9th Cir 1919) (affirming
the conviction of a movie director for presenting a historical film that portrayed soldiers from
Britain-a World War I ally-killing women and children during the Revolutionary War); Cold-
well v United States, 256 F 805,810-11 (1st Cir 1919) (affirming the conviction of a public speaker
for declaring that three convicted draft-dodgers were "victims of a damnable system of govern-
ment"); Kirchner v United States, 255 F 301,303-04 (4th Cir 1918) (affirming the conviction of a
public speaker for stating that the United States government was corrupt, the Select Service Act
was unconstitutional, and people should not purchase United States bonds); Deason v United
States, 254 F 259,261-62 (5th Cir 1918) (affirming the conviction of a man for making threats to
members of a local exemption board in order to have his classification changed); Doe v United
States, 253 F 903, 906-07 (8th Cir 1918) (affirming the conviction of the author and mailer of a
circular stating that Germany had not made or broken a promise to end U-boat warfare as re-
ported by President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing); O'Hare v United States, 253 F 538,
539-40 (8th Cir 1918) (affirming the conviction of a "professional Socialist lecturer" for stating
that men who enlisted in the army would be "used for fertilizer"); Masses Publishing Co v Patten,
246 F 24,38-39 (2d Cir 1917) (reversing Judge Hand's opinion); United States v Nagler, 252 F 217,
222-23 (WD Wis 1918) (convicting a man for declaring the Y.M.C.A., the Y.W.C.A., and the Red
Cross "a bunch of grafters," in reference to their actions during World War I); United States v
Motion Picture Film "The Spirit of '76", 252 F 946,948-49 (SD Cal 1917) (enjoining the presenta-
tion of a film depicting British soldiers killing women and children). For additional citations, see
Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years at 256-61 (cited in note 3).
18 See Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years at 257 (cited in note 3) ("Whatever the
offending language, surrounding circumstances, or jury instructions, almost all prosecutions led
to guilty verdicts.").
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* Rose Pastor Stokes, a Russian immigrant who had worked as a
cigarmaker for twelve years before becoming editor of the social-
ist Jewish Daily News, was convicted and sentenced to ten years
in prison for saying, "I am for the people and the government is
for the profiteers," during an antiwar statement to the Women's
Dining Club of Kansas City. Her speech was later published in
the Kansas City Star. Although there were no soldiers-indeed,
no men-in her intended audience, the government nonetheless
argued that she had violated the Act because "our armies
... can operate and succeed only so far as they are supported and
maintained by the folks at home," and Stokes's statement had the
tendency to "chill enthusiasm, extinguish confidence, and retard
cooperation" of mothers, sisters, and sweethearts.'9
* J.P. Doe, the son of a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire, was convicted for mailing an "endless chain" letter to
"friends of immediate peace" stating that Germany had not bro-
ken a promise to end submarine warfare. Although this was
clearly a matter of historical interpretation and opinion, the gov-
ernment argued that Doe had violated the Act because the sug-
gestion that the United States was unjustified in relying on the
breach of promise as a cause for our entry into the war "would
have a direct tendency to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment
service."2
" D.T.'Blodgett was sentenced to twenty years in prison for circu-
lating a leaflet urging voters in Iowa not to reelect a congressman
who had voted for conscription and arguing that the war served
the interests of capitalists. The trial judge observed that "there is
no better means of unsettling the confidence of the people and
stirring their souls against the war than to paint it as a
19 United States v Stokes, (unreported) (D Mo 1918), revd, 264 F 18 (8th Cir 1920), quoted
in Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States 52-53 (Harvard 1948). See also H.C.
Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite, Opponents of War 185-86 (Wisconsin 1957); Mrs. Rose P Stokes
Convicted of Disloyalty; Illegal to Impair National Morale, Says Judge, NY Times 1 (May 24,
1918); Mrs. Stokes Denies Assailing Red Cross, NY Times 5 (May 22, 1918) (reporting Stokes's
statements during her trial); Mrs. Stokes Denies Disloyal Intent, NY Times 13 (May 23, 1918) (re-
porting the conclusion of Stokes's trial and summation arguments by both attorneys). On March
9, 1920, a federal court of appeals overturned Stokes's conviction, ruling that that district judge
had placed "too heavy a burden" on the defendant because of his inappropriate "patriotic zeal."
Stokes, 264 F at 26. See also Ten-Year Sentence of Mrs. Rose Stokes Overruled by Federal Court in
St. Louis, NY Times 1 (Mar 10, 1920). On November 15, 1921, the government finally dismissed
the charges against Stokes. See Mrs. Stokes Freed; Debs May Soon Be, NY Times 5 (Nov 16,
1921) (reporting that the U.S. Attorney General's office had requested the dismissal of charges).
20 United States v Doe, (unreported) (D Colo 1918), affd, 253 F 903 (8th Cir 1918), quoted
in Chafee, Free Speech in the United States at 54-55 (cited in note 19).
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war of capitalism ... and painting the officers of this government
as ... willing tools of Wall Street."'
Thirty German-Americans in South Dakota were arrested for
sending a petition to the Governor demanding reforms in the se-
lective service procedure. The signers of the petition "threatened"
to vote the Governor out of office if he did not meet their de-
mands. The government charged that the defendants had willfully
obstructed the recruiting and enlistment service.22
The Reverend Clarence H. Waldron was convicted for distribut-
ing a pamphlet stating that "if Christians [are] forbidden to fight
to preserve the Person of their Lord and Master, they may not
fight to preserve themselves, or any city they should happen to
dwell in." The government charged that Waldron had attempted
to cause insubordination and to obstruct the recruiting service.
He was sentenced to fifteen years in prison.2
Robert Goldstein was convicted for producing a motion picture
about the American Revolution. "The Spirit of '76" depicted Paul
Revere's ride, the signing of the Declaration of Independence,
and Washington at Valley Forge. But it also included a scene por-
traying the Wyoming Valley Massacre, in which British soldiers
were depicted bayoneting women and children. The government
charged that this was an attempt to promote insubordination be-
21 United States v Blodgett, (unreported) (SD Iowa 1918), quoted in Walter Nelles, ed, Es-
pionage Act Cases with Certain Others on Related Points 48,52 (National Civil Liberties Bureau
1918).
22 See 30 Germans are Arrested in South Dakota for Opposing the War and the Draft Law,
NY Times 1 (Aug 28, 1917) (reporting that the men were charged with "having signed a petition
of an intimidating character"). While the defendants' appeal was pending in the Supreme Court,
the government offered a "confession of error." See Baltzer v United States, 248 US 593, 593
(1918). For a full discussion of this prosecution, including Justice Holmes's unpublished opinion
in the case, see Sheldon M. Novick, The Unrevised Holmes and Freedom of Expression, 1991 Sup
Ct Rev 303,331-35,388.
23 United States v Waldron, (unreported) (D Vt 1918), quoted in Chafee, Free Speech in the
United States at 55-56 (cited in note 19). The government was especially aggressive in its prose-
cution of clergymen who supported peace or conscientious objection. See Warn Seditious Pas-
tors, NY Times 16 (Mar 31,1918):
Disloyalty fostered by certain religious sects has been growing in the United States.. . ac-
cording to Department of Justice officials... [The government] regards the preaching of
opposition to the aims of this particular war as of seditious nature. Several German and
Austrian preachers and Sunday school teachers have been indicted for disloyal utterances,
and many others ... have been warned to desist from criticising the nation's war motives.
Special Assistant Attorney General John Lord O'Brian declared that "the most dangerous type
of propaganda ... is religious pacifism, i.e., opposition to the war on the ground that it is opposed
to the word of God." Letter from John Lord O'Brian to Rep Edwin Y. Webb, in 65th Cong, 2d
Sess (Apr 16, 1918), in 56 Cong Rec S 5542 (Apr 24, 1918).
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cause of its negative portrayal of our ally in the war against Ger-
many. In upholding the seizure of the film, the trial judge ex-
plained, "History is history, and fact is fact. There is no doubt
about that." But, he added, "this is no time" for "those things that
may have the tendency... of creating animosity or want of confi-
dence between us and our allies." Goldstein was sentenced to ten
years in prison."
In the hands of the Department of Justice and the federal judici-
ary, the Espionage Act thus became an efficient tool for the suppres-
sion of "disloyal utterances." As Professor Zechariah Chafee con-
cluded, under the "bad tendency" interpretation of the Act, "[aill
genuine discussion among civilians of the justice and wisdom of con-
tinuing a war ... becomes perilous."' It was against this background
that Judge Hand decided Masses.
II. MASSES
The Masses was a monthly "revolutionary" journal that regularly
featured "a remarkable group" of authors, including Max Eastman,
Vachel Lindsay, John Reed, Bertrand Russell, Carl Sandburg, Louis
Untermeyer, and Sherwood Anderson. The Masses was iconoclastic,
impertinent, and confrontational. It was an "unusually handsome"journal, "with bright-colored covers and oversize pages filled with
bold drawings and lively social satire, political criticism, and intellec-
tual commentary."26 Irving Howe described The Masses as "a combina-
tion of Circus, nursery, and boxing ring-for almost everything that
was then alive and irreverent in American culture," and Floyd Dell
proclaimed that The Masses stood for "fun, truth, beauty, realism,
freedom, peace, feminism, revolution."" Collectively owned and gov-
erned, The Masses was "not so much a publishing venture as a move-
ment,.., a way of life."' "
24 "The Spirit of '76", 252 F at 947-48 (SD Cal 1917) (confiscating the film and prohibiting
its presentation without modification). See Peterson and Fite, Opponents of War at 185-86 (cited
in note 19). The movie was finally screened at Town Hall in New York City in July of 1921. See
Revive 'Spirit of '76,' Film Barred in 1917, NY Times 18 (July 14,1921).
One of the most extreme of the Espionage Act prosecutions was that of Walter Matthey of
Iowa, who, according to Attorney General Gregory, was sentenced to a year in jail for "attending
a meeting, listening to an address in which disloyal utterances were made, applauding some of
the [disloyal] statements made by the speaker ... and contributing 259." See Robert Justin Gold-
stein, Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to the Present 114 (Schenkman 1978).
25 Chafee, Free Speech in the United States at 51-52 (cited in note 19).
26 Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand 153 (Knopf 1994) (describing the character of The
Masses and detailing its beginnings).
27 William O'Neill, The Last Romantic: A Life of Max Eastman 40 (Oxford 1978) (quoting
Irving Howe and Floyd Dell).
28 Id at 34. See also Sylvia A. Law, Crystal Eastman: Organizer for Women's Rights Peace
and Civil Liberties in the 1910s, 28 Valp U L Rev 1305 (1994).
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In the summer of 1917, Postmaster General Burleson ordered the
August issue of The Masses to be excluded from the mail, exercising
his authority under the Espionage Act of 1917. The Masses sought an
injunction to forbid the local postmaster from refusing to accept the
August issue for mailing.9 The postmaster argued that four cartoons
and four pieces of text violated the Act, thus justifying the order of
exclusion. °
Illustrative of these was a cartoon by Henry J. Glentenkamp enti-
tled "Conscription" and a poem by Josephine Bell entitled "A Trib-
ute." The cartoon depicted a cannon, to the mouth of which is bound
the naked figure of a youth, to the wheel that of a woman marked
"Democracy," and upon the carriage that of a man marked "Labor."
On the ground kneels a draped woman marked "Motherhood" in a
posture of grief. An infant lies on the ground beside her."
The poem, a "tribute" to Emma Goldman and Alexander Berk-
man, who were then in jail for opposing the war and the draft, in-
cluded the following verse:
Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman
Are in prison tonight,
But they have made themselves elemental forces,
Like the water that climbs down the rocks;
Like the wind in the leaves;
Like the gentle night that holds us;
They are working on our destinies;
They are forging the love of the nations; ...
Tonight they lie in prison.32
The postmaster argued that the cartoons and text violated section
3 of the Espionage Act, in that they willfully caused or attempted "to
cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny or refusal of duty in the mili-
tary or naval forces" and obstructed "the recruiting or enlistment ser-
vice of the United States."" Judge Learned Hand granted the injunc-
tion and prohibited the postmaster from excluding The Masses from
the mail.
Judge Hand fully appreciated the significance of this case for him
personally. Hand knew he was then under consideration for promo-
tion to the court of appeals, a promotion he richly deserved and much
desired. When he learned that he had been assigned the case, he wrote
29 Murphy, World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties at 196 (cited in note 7).
30 See Masses, 244 F at 542-43.
31 The cartoon is reprinted in Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years at 263 (cited in
note 3).
32 The verse is reprinted in Masses, 244 F at 544.
33 Id at 536-37.
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his wife that if the case were not quickly settled, "my decision would
go against [the government], and then whoop-la your little man is in
the mud." He added that "[t]here are times when the old bunk about
an independent and fearless judiciary means a good deal.''..
Judge Hand began his opinion by observing that in times of war
"[i]t may be that Congress may forbid the mails to any matter which
tends to discourage the successful prosecution of the war."35 But he did
not need to resolve the First Amendment issue because, in his judg-
ment, the Act did not cover the material published in The Masses.
Judge Hand conceded the postmaster's claim that "to arouse dis-
content and disaffection among the people with the prosecution of the
war and with the draft tends to promote a mutinous and insubordinate
temper among the troops." But he argued that to read to word "cause"
so "broadly would ... involve necessarily as a consequence the sup-
pression of all hostile criticism, and of all opinion except what encour-
aged and supported the existing policies.'
34 Gunther, Learned Hand at 155 (cited in note 26). Judge Hand was not the only federal
district court judge to adopt a speech-protective interpretation of the Espionage Act of 1917.
Judge George Bourquin of Montana presided over the prosecution of Ves Hall, who was alleged
to have announced in a series of encounters at a picnic, in a hotel kitchen, and in a saloon that
"he would flee to avoid going to war," that "Germany would whip the United States, and he
hoped so," that "the President was a Wall Street tool," that Germany had had the right "to sink
ships and kill Americans without warning," and that "the United States was only fighting for Wall
Street millionaires and to protect Morgan's interests in England." United States v Hall, (unre-
ported) (D Mont 1918), printed in HR 8753, 65th Cong, 2d Sess, in 56 Cong Rec S 4560 (Apr 4,
1918).
Hall was charged with violating Section 3 of the Act. Judge Bourquin directed a verdict of
acquittal, finding that Hall's comments could not be held to violate Section 3. Judge Bourquin
noted that Hall's comments "were made at a Montana village of some sixty people, sixty miles
from the railway," and that no soldiers or sailors were "within hundreds of miles." He therefore
concluded that any inference that Hall's remarks had been specifically intended to "interfere
with the operations or success of the military," or were reasonably likely to do so, would be "un-justified, absurd and without support in the evidence." Judge Bourquin offered that in these cir-
cumstances the most likely consequence of Hall's speech was "a broken head." Id. Senator Walsh
described Judge Bourquin's decision in Hall as "notorious" and predicted that it would unleash
"those who might be disposed to assist the cause of our enemies." HR 8753,65th Cong, 2d Sess,
in 56 Cong Rec S 4559-60 (Apr 4,1918). The day after Judge Bourquin's ruling, the Governor of
Montana announced that the citizens of the state were so furious that "I really expect some kill-
ing." Murphy, World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties at 200 (cited in note 7).
Another federal district court judge who construed the Espionage Act "narrowly" was Judge
Charles Fremont Amidon of North Dakota. In United States v Schutte, 252 F 212, 214 (D ND
1918), for example, Judge Amidon dismissed the prosecution of B.H. Schutte, a farmer who had
stated publicly that "this is a rich man's war and it is all a damn graft and a swindle." Judge Ami-
don explained that there was no evidence that Schutte's comments had been made to an audi-
ence containing men who were in the armed forces or who were eligible for the draft. See id.
Judge Amidon was pilloried in the North Dakota press, denounced by the president of the North
Dakota Bar Association, ostracized by friends and associates, and threatened in letters and
phone calls, See Murphy, World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties at 208-09 (cited in
note 7).
35 Masses, 244 F at 538.
36 Id at 539.
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Judge Hand reasoned that such an approach "would contradict
the normal assumption of democratic government," and even assum-
ing that Congress would have the power in time of war "to repress
such opinion," the exercise of that power "is so contrary to the use and
wont of our people that only the clearest expression of such a power
justifies the conclusion that it was intended." In these circumstances,
he concluded, the actual "language of the statute" did not require such
an interpretation.37
This was a critical step in Judge's Hand opinion, and it is the step
I address in this Essay. As I noted at the outset, the conventional wis-
dom is that this was merely a rhetorical device-and a shady one at
that--to enable Judge Hand to reach his desired outcome." This is
wrong.
There were two elements to Judge Hand's reasoning. First, as of
1917, was it reasonable for Judge Hand to conclude that a broad pro-
hibition of all criticism that "could arouse discontent and disaffection
among the people" during a war is "contrary to the use and wont of
our people"? The answer, as of that time in our history, has to be "yes."
The clearest example to the contrary was the Sedition Act of
1798, but by 1917 no one invoked that episode as a positive example.
To the contrary, it was consistently referred to in the debates over the
Espionage Act as a mistake to be avoided. 9 In the years since 1800,
there had never been any federal legislation restricting this sort of
speech in wartime (or otherwise), including the War of 1812, the Civil
War, the Mexican War, and the Spanish-American War. ° And although
the military arrest and prosecution of Clement Vallandigham and sev-
eral other "Copperheads" during the Civil War would fit generally
within this description (albeit without any authorizing federal legisla-
tion), they were relatively isolated events that were regarded more as
37 Id at 540. There are, of course, many complex and controversial theories of statutory in-
terpretation. Because my inquiry in this Essay is relatively modest, it does not implicate the
many intricacies of these competing theories. In the end, my point is simply that there is no rea-
son to believe that a majority of those in Congress who supported the Espionage Act intended
or expected it to depart radically from generally accepted principles of criminal law or to have
the far-reaching effects the courts attributed to it within a very short period of time. On the vari-
ous theories of statutory interpretation, see William Eskridge, Philip Frickey, and Elizabeth
Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation 669-71 (West 2001).
38 See, for example, Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years at 265 (cited in note 3)
(stating that Hand's "confident assertion" that Congress did not intend to "invoke such power"
with the Espionage Act was belied by the Act's legislative history).
39 See Michael Kent Curtis, Free Speech, "The People's Darling Privilege": Struggles for
Freedom of Expression in American History 317-18 (Duke 2000) (stating that though Civil War-
era supporters of suppression of speech might have cited the Sedition Act, their failure to do so
"shows the extent to which the robust popular free speech tradition had triumphed on that is-
sue").
40 See id at 5 (stating that from 1800 to 1860 "[t]he national government had little or no
power over speech or press").
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an embarrassment to Lincoln and the nation than as a precedent to be
followed.
Second, was it reasonable for Judge Hand to conclude that the
Espionage Act of 1917 did not require the interpretation advocated by
the Postmaster General and embraced by almost every other federal
court? To answer this question, we must consider the legislative his-
tory of the Espionage Act.
III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1917
Three sections of the bill initially drafted by the Department of
Justice are relevant to this question. For the sake of convenience, I will
refer to them as the "press censorship" provision, the "disaffection"
provision, and the "nonmailability" provision. An understanding of
the debate over these provisions is essential to understanding the leg-
islative background against which Judge Hand interpreted the Espio-
nage Act in Masses.
As presented to Congress, the "press censorship" provision would
have declared it unlawful for any person in time of war to publish any
information that the President, in his judgment, declared to be "of
such character that it is or might be useful to the enemy." The provi-
sion added that "nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or
restrict any discussion, comment, or criticism of the acts or policies of
the Government." 2
The "disaffection" provision would have declared it unlawful for
any person in time of war: (a) willfully to "make or convey false re-
ports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or
success" of the military forces of the United States or "to promote the
success of its enemies," or (b) willfully to "cause or attempt to cause
disaffection in the military or naval forces of the United States."3
41 See id at 348-56 (examining the effects of Vallandigham's arrest for open opposition to
the Civil War and the Lincoln Administration and noting that the "high public regard for free-
dom of speech" and "strong negative reaction to the Vallandigham case" led Lincoln to limit his
policy of speech suppression); Paul Finkelman, Civil Liberties and Civil War: The Great Emanci-
pator as Civil Libertarian, 91 Mich L Rev 1353, 1380 (1993) ("The arrests and violations of civil
liberties under Lincoln illustrate the propensity for prosecutorial zeal during wartime."); Mark E.
Neely, Jr., The Fate of Liberty:Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties 205 (Oxford 1991) ("No sin-
gle arrest in 1864 dramatized or symbolized the civil-liberties issue, as Vallandigham's had in
1863."); J.G. Randall, Constitutional Problems under Lincoln 179 n 16 (Illinois rev ed 1951)
(quoting Lincoln as saying that "[a]ll the Cabinet regretted the necessity of arresting ... Val-
landigham" and noting that the President commuted Vallandigham's sentence from confinement
to expulsion to the Confederacy).
42 HR 291 tit I § 4,65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 1695 (May 2, 1917).
43 See 54 Cong Rec S 3606-07 (Feb 19, 1917) (discussing the use of the word "disaffec-
tion"). Violations were punishable by fines of up to $10,000 and prison sentences of up to twenty
years, or both. See Espionage Act of 1917,40 Stat at 219.
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The "nonmailability" provision would have granted the Postmas-
ter General authority to exclude from the mails any writing or publi-
cation that is "in violation of any of the provisions of this act" or is "of
a treasonable or anarchistic character."'
The "press censorship" provision provoked the most heated
discussion. Indeed, the Wilson administration's proposal of this
provision triggered a firestorm of protest from the press, which ob-
jected that the provision would effectively give the President the final
authority to determine whether the press could, or could not, publish
information about the conduct of the war. The American Newspaper
Publishers' Association, for example, declared that this provision
"strikes at the fundamental rights of the people, not only assailing
their freedom of speech but also seeking to deprive them of the means
of forming intelligent opinion." The Association added that "in war
especially the press should be free, vigilant, and unfettered."Y
Individual newspapers were equally critical. The New York Times
assailed the provision as "high-handed" and "Prussian," asserting that
"the newspaper or the individual who criticizes or points out defect in
policies ... with the honest purpose of promoting remedial action ... is
not a public enemy."' The Milwaukee News characterized the press
censorship provision as a "glaring attempt ... to muzzle the press" that
"smack[s] of unconstitutionality, tyranny, and deceit." 7 And the Phila-
delphia Evening Telegraph stated that "it is neither necessary nor rea-
sonable that there should be any power in this country ... to control
the voice of the press, or of the people, in honest judgment of the acts
of public servants.""
When the "press censorship" provision was first presented to the
House on April 30, 1917, Representative Webb of North Carolina, the
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, initiated the debate by
announcing that the nation's newspapers had unfairly "created the
impression" that the Committee, which had approved the bill, "was
undertaking to unduly abridge the freedom of the press." He sternly
reminded the press that:
44 Report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, Report No
30,65th Cong, 1st Sess 9 (1917); HR 291 § 1100, 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 1595 (Apr
30, 1917); Letter from W.W. Lamar, Solicitor of the Post Office Department, to Rep Edwin Y.
Webb, 65th Cong, 1st Sess (Apr 20, 1917), in 55 Cong Rec H 1595 (Apr 30,1917).
45 Resolutions of the American Newspaper Publishers' Association, 65th Cong, 1st Sess
(Apr 25,1917), in 55 Cong Rec S 1861 (May 5,1917).
46 The Espionage Bill, NY Times 12 (Apr 13,1917).
47 Milwaukee News (Apr 30,1917), quoted in Thomas F Carroll, Freedom of Speech and of
the Press in War Time: The Espionage Act, 17 Mich L Rev 621,624 (1919).
48 Quoted in Oppose Censorship as Now Proposed, NY Times 7 (Apr 22, 1917). See also
65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 1709-10 (May 2, 1917) (similar editorials from the New
York American, the Philadelphia Inquirer, and the Washington Times).
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[I]n time of war, while men are giving up their sons and while
people are giving up their money, [the press] should at least be
willing to give up their right ... to publish ... those things which
the President of the United States thinks would be hurtful to the
United States and helpful to the enemy.'
Representative Webb argued further:
We are in just one of those situations where we have to trust
somebody. The President is the Commander in Chief... and he
has in his hands the military control of the boys of the mothers of
the country, and ... that is as sacred a trust as it is for him to pre-
scribe what in his opinion is information which would be useful
to the enemy.5O
Echoing this view, Senator Husting of Wisconsin maintained that these
"are extraordinary measures, and I would not support them as peace
measures, but we are now in extraordinary times ... [and] extraordi-
nary remedies are necessary if we want to maintain the integrity and
the safety of this Nation.""
Senator Overman of North Carolina argued that "the good of so-
ciety is superior to the right of the press to publish what it pleases;
wherefore, if the activities of newspapers were a hindrance in the
prosecution of the war, their curtailment would not be unconstitu-
tional."52 Representative Volstead of Minnesota asked pointedly how
the nation would feel if American troops were "sent to the bottom of
the sea as a result of information" published because this provision is
not enacted. "It is utterly ridiculous," he declared, "for anybody to
contend that this provision is unconstitutional.""
The opposition to the provision was fierce. Representative Fess of
Ohio warned that "in time of war we are very apt to do things that we
would not think of doing in time of peace," and that this is a "danger
when we are in a spirit of war."' Senator Johnson of California re-
minded his colleagues that "the preservation of free speech" is of
"transcendent importance . . . whenever there is a time of stress,
49 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 1590-91 (Apr 30,1917). See also id at 1695 (May
2, 1917) (Rep Morgan's observation that "in time of great national peril, it is necessary some-
times that individual citizens shall be willing to surrender some of the privileges which they have
for the sake of the greater good").
50 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 1592 (Apr 30, 1917). See also Carroll, 17 Mich L
Rev at 627 (cited in note 47) (noting that an important defense of the provision was the argu-
ment that "the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the military forces, is the best judge" of
whether such control of the press is "necessary to carry the war to a successful conclusion").
51 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec S 2087 (May 11, 1917).
52 Carroll, 17 Mich L Rev at 628 (cited-in note 47).
53 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 3137 (May 31,1917).
54 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 1591 (Apr 30, 1917).
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whenever there is excitement, whenever there are enthusiasms in
which we lose our judgment.""
Describing the provision as "un-American," Representative
Madden of Illinois protested that "while we are fighting to establish
the democracy of the world, we ought not to do the thing that will es-
tablish autocracy in America."'' Senator Borah of Idaho charged that
the provision "boldly, brazenly, indifferently [disregards] a plain, vital
provision of our fundamental law." Senator Henry Cabot Lodge ex-
pressed concern that the government officials who would administer
this provision would naturally be inclined to use their authority to
censor legitimate public criticism.8 And Representative McCormick of
Illinois, voicing a concern expressed by many members of Congress,
and using a variety of different hypothetical situations, noted that it
was appalling to think that if "there was an epidemic in the Army" the
proposed provision would authorize the President to prohibit anyone
from "drawing public attention to the condition of the troops." 9
Proponents of the provision repeatedly invoked the clause guar-
anteeing that "nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or re-
strict any discussion, comment, or criticism of the acts or policies of
the Government."' Opponents replied that it was impossible effec-
tively to criticize the "policies of the Government" without discussing
the information on which the criticism was based. Representative Vol-
stead tried to reassure opponents of the provision by stating that he
55 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec S 2097 (May 11, 1917). Rep LaGuardia of New York
characterized the provision as a potentially "vicious precedent," 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong
Rec H 1594 (Apr 30,1917), and Rep Wood of Indiana warned that it would be "an instrument of
tyranny," 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 1773 (May 3, 1917). Rep Schall of Minnesota
proclaimed that "America is not made of the stuff that has to be coddled along with tales of win-
ning to make her fight." All that is needed, he said, is to "[t]ell her the truth." 65th Cong, 1st Sess,
in 55 Cong Rec H 1775 (May 3,1917).
56 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 1773 (May 3,1917).
57 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec S 2119 (May 11, 1917). On another occasion, Senator
Borah said that the Act "has all the ear marks of a dictatorship. It suppresses free speech and
does it all in the name of war and patriotism." Claudius 0. Johnson, Borah of Idaho 214 (Long-
mans, Green 1936) (quoting a letter from Sen Borah to a friend). See also Paul L. Murphy,
Communities in Conflict, in Alan Reitman, ed, The Pulse of Freedom:American Liberties 1920-
1970s 23,25 (Norton 1975) (quoting Sen Borah: "I am charged with radicalism for opposing gov-
ernment repression.").
58 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec S 781 (Apr 18,1917) (stating that the Act would vest
the censorship board with "a dangerous power").
59 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 1606 (Apr 30, 1917). For another example, see
65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec S 2099 (May 11, 1917) (under this provision "it would be a
violation of law for the newspapers of the country ... to print the crop reports, which are inti-
mately related to our military efficiency and the national defense") (remarks of Sen Smith). For
a counterexample, see 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec S 2102 (May 11, 1917) (it would be
"the height of unwisdom to make public in the midst of war ... the intention of this Government
... to cover the North Sea with submerged floating mines") (remarks of Sen Stone).
60 See 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 1602 (Apr 30,1917) (quoting Rep Platt read-
ing the relevant section to the House).
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had "no doubt that when a man" speaks "with good intentions ...
there will be no difficulty at all."6'
At times, the debate grew quite testy. At one point, Representa-
tive Webb accused Representative Madden, who was questioning the
constitutionality of the provision, of "taking the part of the newspa-
pers." Madden replied: "I am taking the part of the American peo-ple."'
When it began to appear that the press censorship proposal might
go down to defeat, President Wilson made a direct appeal to Congress,
stating that the "authority to exercise censorship over the press ... is
absolutely necessary to the public safety."6 Members of Congress were
unmoved. Representative Hersey of Maine, for example, complained
that "we, the Congress of the United States," are now "importuned by
the executive ... to enact unconstitutional laws, to place in the hands
of the President unlawful powers, to grant to him the ... authority to
take away from the citizen the protection of the Constitution.""
On May 31, the House defeated the provision by a vote of 184 to
144, with 36 Democrats joining the Republican opposition. 6 This ef-
fectively ended consideration of the "press censorship" provision for
the duration of the war."
The "nonmailability" provision also generated controversy. Sev-
eral members of Congress objected to granting the Postmaster Gen-
eral such broad authority to exclude political material from the mails.
Senator Thomas of Colorado, for example, argued that this provision
would enable postmasters to exclude "legitimate" as well as illegiti-
mate publications, and would thus produce "a far greater evil than the
evil which is sought to be prevented." 6  Representative London of
New York declared the provision a "menace to freedom," adding that
"there is nothing more oppressive ... than a democracy gone mad."6
61 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 1607 (Apr 30,1917).
62 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 1593 (Apr 30,1917).
63 Wilson Demands Press Censorship, NY Times 1 (May 23, 1917) (quoting a letter from
Woodrow Wilson to Rep Webb). The administration offered a "compromise" version of the press
censorship provision, which failed to pass. See Conf Rep No 65, on HR 291, 65th Cong, 1st Sess,
in 55 Cong Rec H 3124, 3125 (May 31, 1917) (amended press censorship provision in
title I, section 4).
64 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 3134 (May 31, 1917).
65 See House Defeats Censorship Law by 184 to 144, NY Times 1 (June 1, 1917) (stating
that party lines were "shattered" in defeating the bill).
66 The House instructed the conferees to strike the press censorship provision from the
bill. See House of Representatives Report No 69, 65th Cong, 1st Sess 19 (1917). The press cen-
sorship provision appeared at title I, section 4 of the bill. See Report of the Committee on the
Judiciary, No 30 at 2 (cited in note 44).
67 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec S 2062 (May 10, 1917).
68 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 1779 (May 3, 1917) (noting that while the press
censorship provision was a menace to newspapers, the "nonmailability" provision was a "menace
to all").
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And Senator Borah cautioned that "it is perfectly useless to talk about
stopping the dissemination and interchange of thought and views
upon these questions among the people of the United States" because
"the more you dam up the stream the more liable you are to have a
flood when it breaks over."'
There was particular concern about the phrases "treasonable"
and "anarchistic." This led to a lengthy and rather remarkable debate
over the meaning, or lack of meaning, of these terms.70 Representative
Johnson objected that this provision would be "subject to the ruling of
whomever happens to be high in the Post Office Department."'" As if
to illustrate the point, Representative Eagle, quoting a letter from the
Socialist Party, made clear his view that "they have a perfect right to
say" that the Party "strongly affirms its allegiance to the principle of
internationalism," but that it is "treasonable" for the Party to say that
the war against Germany "cannot be justified."
After vigorous debate, Congress amended the "nonmailability"
provision to replace the phrase "treasonable or anarchistic character"
with the much narrower phrase "containing any matter advocating or
urging treason, insurrection or forcible resistance to any law of the
United States."73 Thus, Congress took seriously the constitutional and
policy objections to granting too broad a discretion to the Postmaster
General and significantly limited and sharpened the scope of his au-
thority.4
69 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec S 2062 (May 10, 1917) (noting that similar attempts
during the Civil War "wrought a greater evil than would [otherwise] have resulted"). See also
65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec S 2118-19 (May 11, 1917) (Sen Borah: "There is not a single
decision to be cited anywhere but holds that any law which undertakes to control the publication
previous to its publication is in violation of the Constitution.").
70 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 1595-97 (Apr 30, 1917) (beginning with the ques-
tion from Rep Fess, "'Treasonable' is defined, but what is 'anarchistic'?"). The debate also
touched upon "nihilism" and the views of Tolstoy and Emerson.
71 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 1604 (Apr 30, 1917) (noting that the opinion of
the solicitor of the Post Office Department would "prevail without a trial").
72 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 1607 (Apr 30,1917).
73 Conf Rep No 65, on HR 291, 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 3124,3129 (May 29,
1917); 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 3306 (June 7, 1917).
74 One might ask why Congress refused to give the President any discretion over the press
in the "press censorship" provision but was willing to give some discretion to the Postmaster
General in the "nonmailability" provision. One possible explanation is that the press itself was
much more concerned with the "press censorship" provision because it would apply even to
mainstream newspapers. See Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years at 253 (cited in note 3)
(noting the contradiction between Congress's treatment of the press censorship provision and its
treatment of the "nonmailability" provision). Another possible explanation is that the Postmas-
ter General had always had some authority to exclude materials from the mails (for example, ob-
scene material), whereas the President had never been empowered by Congress to exercise such
authority over the press.
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The "disaffection" provision, which turned out to be the most
important provision of the bill, received less attention." But even this
provision was amended in a very significant manner.
The difficulties with the "disaffection" provision were made most
clear in the hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary.
Gilbert Roe, a distinguished attorney who represented the Free
Speech League, testified that this provision was even more trouble-
some than the Sedition Act of 1798. Roe explained that the Sedition
Act granted the defense of truth. Under the "disaffection" provision,
however, every effort to discuss or criticize the conduct of the war is
"brought under the ban of the proposed statute." Indeed, under the
"disaffection" provision, "the matter published or spoken may be the
truth, and probably the greater the truth the greater the disaffection
its dissemination would cause." To illustrate the magnitude of the
problem, Roe noted that "the people ... retain their right at the next
election to return to Congress Senators and Representatives ... who
are opposed to the continuation of the war." How, he asked the Com-
mittee, is any voter "to form an intelligent opinion" on this question
"unless there is the fullest discussion permitted of every phase of the
war, its origin, its manner of prosecution, and its manner of termina-
tion?"76
Professor Emily Balch of Wellesley College also testified against
the "disaffection" provision. Balch noted because this provision will
be enforced in wartime it was essential to guard against the risks of
war hysteria. Representative Caraway assured Balch that "it is the in-
tent to cause disaffection" and not the intent "to right a wrong" that
makes a statement criminal. Professor Balch was not comforted. She
replied that if an individual criticized the conduct of the war in order
"to right a wrong," the prosecutor could nonetheless argue that the
statement had contributed to disaffection and that the defendant
should have expected that result. Balch was concerned that the prose-
cutor could then try to equate expectation with intent. When re-
minded by Representative Whaley that this was not entirely up to the
prosecution because a jury would have to rule on intent, Professor
Balch responded that "in time of war a jury ... is no less liable to hys-
teria than those higher up.,77
In light of such concerns, the Committee found the phrase "disaf-
fection" to be "too broad," "too elastic," and "too indefinite." 78 In or-
75 See id at 250 ("It is ironic that the section of the bill that ultimately provided the basis
for most of the prosecution hardly received any attention [from Congress].").
76 Hearings before the House of Representatives Conunittee on the Judiciary, 65th Cong,
1st Sess, Hearings on HR 291 at 36-43 (Apr 9 & 12, 1917).
77 Id at 12-13.
78 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 1594 (Apr 30, 1917) (Rep Webb).
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der to narrow and clarify this provision, the Committee replaced the
phrase "cause or attempt to cause disaffection" with the phrase "cause
or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of
duty."79 Representative Webb explained that "to make it a crime to
create disaffection" in the military "might subject a perfectly innocent
person to punishment," offering as an illustration the case of a mother
who "might write to a boy and tell him the sad conditions back
home."
After nine weeks of sometimes grueling, sometimes divisive, and
sometimes impassioned debate, Congress enacted the Espionage Act
of 1917. After the various emendations, including the elimination of
the "press censorship" provision and the narrowing amendments to
the "disaffection" and "nonmailability" provisions, the relevant part of
section 3 of title I of the Act made it a crime when the nation is at war
for any person: (a) willfully to "make or convey false reports or false
statements with intent to interfere" with the military success of the
United States or "to promote the success of its enemies"; (b) willfully
to "cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or
refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States"; or
(c) willfully to "obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the
United States."8 The Act also authorized the Postmaster General to
exclude from the mails any writing or publication that is "in violation
of any of the provisions of this act" or that contains "any matter advo-
cating or urging treason, insurrection or forcible resistance to any law
of the United States."'
As the congressional debate suggests, the legislation, as enacted,
was not a broadside attack on all criticism of the war. It was, rather, a
carefully considered enactment designed to deal with very specific
military concerns. Although Congress's stance in enacting the Espio-
nage Act could hardly be characterized as civil libertarian, its elimina-
tion of the press censorship provision (over the strong objections of
the President) and its significant amendments to both the "disaffec-
tion" and "nonmailability" provisions reflected a genuine concern for
the potential impact of the legislation on the freedom of speech and of
the press. As Special Assistant Attorney General John Lord O'Brian
observed in 1919, the Espionage Act of 1917 "was not directed against
disloyal utterances." Rather, its "sole aim was to protect the process of
79 See Espionage Act of 1917,40 Stat at 219.
80 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 1594-95 (Apr 30, 1917).
81 Espionage Act of 1917, 40 Stat at 219. What I have labeled provision (c) was not in the
original bill, but was added during the course of congressional deliberations.
82 Espionage Act of 1917,40 Stat at 230-31.
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raising and maintaining our armed forces from the dangers of disloyal
propaganda."'
Indeed, throughout the debate on the Act, there were expansive
statements about the importance of free speech, even in wartime.
Representative Cooper of Wisconsin, for example, maintained that "in
this Republic mere 'error of opinion is never dangerous when reason
is free to combat it."' ' Representative London of New York declared
that "[i]f there are any treasonable thoughts in the minds of the
American people, I want them expressed; if there is any discontent
with the war, I want to hear it." He conceded that complaints about
the conduct of the war or about "a shortage of food" or "incompe-
tence in high places" will be "encouraging to the enemy." But, he
asked, "[s]hall we suppress them, or shall we find compensation in the
opportunity to have wrongs righted by the curing power of free dis-
cussion?" 8' Senator Sterling, a strong supporter of the Act, assured his
colleagues that "there is in this bill no prohibition on criticism, or cen-
sure, or even ridicule of any of the acts or operations or policies of the
Government, or any of its representatives."' And even Representative
Webb, the Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, em-




Although there were as many statements expressing a more re-
strictive view of the First Amendment, the overall sense of the con-
gressional debate suggests a lack of any clear consensus about either
the likely effects of the Act or the meaning of the freedom of speech.
As Senator Borah noted with exasperation at one point in the debate,
"I have not found any two Senators who agree upon what [the Act]
means."
This lack of common understanding was strikingly evident in the
hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary. Mrs. William
Thomas, who represented the Women's Peace Party, asked the Com-
mittee whether under the Act "I am to be allowed ... to say I do not
83 O'Brian, 42 Rep NY St Bar Assn at 299-300 (cited in note 4).
84 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 1597 (Apr 30,1917) (Rep Cooper quoting Thomas
Jefferson).
85 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 1780 (May 3, 1917) (Rep London stating that he
would support "every measure that will guard the military and naval secrets of the country," but
nothing more).
86 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec S 2116 (May 11, 1917). On the other hand, in the
same speech, Senator Sterling also quoted approvingly an excerpt from a publication stating that
if a newspaper "publishes statements the obvious effect and probable purpose of which are to
give aid and comfort to the enemy, its editor should be liable to punishment." Id.
87 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec H 1596 (Apr 30, 1917).
88 65th Cong, 1st Sess, in 55 Cong Rec S 2120 (May 11, 1917). Although Senator Borah was
referring specifically to the press censorship provision, his observation was clearly applicable
more generally.
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believe in killing human beings and I do not want my sons to ... kill
other women's sons?" She received a range of confused and confusing
responses.
Chairman Webb, for example, replied that "you may voice a con-
scientious objection to fighting, but you can not go on with this propa-
ganda, if it is calculated to interfere with the military forces." Repre-
sentative Walker added that "now that we are at war ... you ought not
do anything which would prevent us from bringing the war to a suc-
cessful conclusion." Representative Summers opined that if "some-
body was trying to enlist men on one corner of a street... and you
were having a meeting on the other corner in which you were de-
nouncing the Government,... I do not believe you could have such a
meeting." And Representative Dyer, venting his evident annoyance
with Mrs. Thomas, declared that "this bill would not permit you to
hold meetings and have speeches criticizing the President." To under-
score the point, he added that "people should go ahead and obey the
law, keep their mouths shut, and let the Government run the war."
Representative Eaton, attempting to exert a calming influence, sug-
gested that there appears to be "a distinct vagueness among the mem-
bers of the committee as to how far this abridgment of speech is go-ing. '' 9
One thing that was certain, however, was the administration's
disappointment in the legislation as enacted. Attorney General Greg-
ory expressed his frustration a year later in a statement to the Ameri-
can Bar Association, whose support he was then seeking for an ex-
panded version of section three. The Attorney General complained
that when the war "broke out" the administration "secured the pas-
sage of the Espionage Act, but most of the teeth which we tried to put
in it were taken out." "We got what we could," he added, "but Con-
gress itself did not realize at that time the conditions that would con-
front us." The changes Congress had made to section three were
clearly of consequence to the Department of Justice, which had sought
and expected a more effective tool to control dissent.-
IV. JUDGE HAND'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE
ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1917
This brings me back to the question of whether Congress in-
tended the Espionage Act to have the effect given it by the federal ju-
diciary. The answer is clearly "no." In light of Congress's elimination of
89 Hearings before the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, 65th Cong,
1st Sess, Hearings on HR 291 at 19-25 (Apr 9 & 12,1917).
90 Thomas Gregory, Suggestions of Attorney General Gregory to Executive Committee in
Relation to the Department of Justice, 4 ABA J 305,306 (1918).
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the press censorship provision, its rejection of the "disaffection" provi-
sion, and its abandonment of the "treasonable or anarchistic" lan-
guage in the "nonmailability" provision, it seems unarguable that
Congress did not intend this Act to outlaw any criticism of the gov-
ernment or the war that "could arouse discontent and disaffection
among the people." Had Congress wanted to prohibit expression so
broadly, it could surely have said so."
What Congress did say in the Espionage Act of 1917 was that it
wanted to restrict expression only if it willfully caused or attempted to
cause certain specifically defined consequences concerning the effec-
tiveness of the armed forces of the nation. Although the precise line
between speech that falls within that prohibition and speech that falls
beyond it is far from clear, and not always easy to define or enforce,
there can be no doubt that in 1917 Congress meant for there to be
some such line.
The challenge for Judge Hand, then, was to separate "legitimate"
from "illegitimate" speech under the Act.9 Judge Hand began his
analysis of this question by asserting that it "has always" been recog-
nized that "[o]ne may not counsel or advise others to violate the law
as it stands." Words, he observed, "are not only the keys of persuasion,
but the triggers of action, and those which have no purport but to
counsel the violation of law cannot by any latitude of interpretation
be a part of that public opinion which is the final source of govern-
ment in a democratic state."93
Judge Hand conceded that speech falling short of express incite-
ment to violate the law can have negative consequences. "Political agi-
tation," he noted, "by the passions it arouses or the convictions in en-
genders, may . . . stimulate men to the violation of law," and
"[d]etestation of existing policies is easily transformed into forcible
resistance of the authority which puts them in execution." But, he rea-
soned, "to assimilate agitation, legitimate as such, with direct incite-
ment to violent resistance, is to disregard the tolerance of all methods
of political agitation which in normal times is a safeguard of free gov-
ernment." This "distinction," he emphasized, "is not a scholastic sub-
terfuge, but a hard-bought acquisition in the fight for freedom."''4
91 Indeed, Congress did say so a year later in the Sedition Act of 1918, in which it declared
it unlawful, among other things, for any person to "utter, print, write or publish any disloyal, pro-
fane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the United States, or the
Constitution of the United States, or the military or naval forces of the United States, or the
flag." Sedition Act of 1918,40 Stat 553.
92 Although Judge Hand did not cite any of the legislative history of the 1917 Act in
Masses, he was surely familiar with the debate in Congress, which was widely covered in the
press.
93 Masses, 244 F at 540.
94 Id.
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Judge Hand thus concluded that "[i]f one stops short of urging"
others to violate the law, "one should not be held to have attempted to
cause its violation. If that be not the test," he cautioned, "I can see no
escape from the conclusion that under this [Act] every political agita-
tion which can be shown to be apt to create a seditious temper is ille-
gal." He declared his confidence that "Congress had no such revolu-
tionary purpose in view."9 Applying this approach to the facts of
Masses, Judge Hand held that neither the cartoons nor the text
crossed the line of direct advocacy of unlawful conduct.9
CONCLUSION
Most federal judges during the First World War were "intent
upon meting out quick justice and severe punishment to the 'dis-
loyal,"' and no details of legislative interpretation or appeals to the
First Amendment were likely "to stand in the way.' 'n As Special Assis-
tant Attorney General O'Brian concluded, "The standard by which
95 Id. One might ask whether the 1918 Sedition Act, which was enacted well after Judge
Hand's decision in Masses, was designed to enact unambiguously what Congress had actually in-
tended to enact in the 1917 Espionage Act. On that view, the terms of the 1918 Act might be read
back into the 1917 Act, and Judge Hand's understanding of the Espionage Act would then surely
be wrong. But this is implausible. The purpose of the 1918 Act was quite clearly to broaden and
strengthen the prohibitions of the Espionage Act. A year of war, with all of its casualties, had
significantly changed the mood of the country and the Congress. Whatever tolerance may have
existed for dissent in 1917 was largely dissipated after a year of brutal conflict and unrelenting
government-sponsored anti-German propaganda. See also Chafee, Free Speech in the United
States at 40 (cited in note 19) (the enactment of the Sedition Act shows "what is likely to happen
in times of panic"). Throughout the debates on the Sedition Act, almost every member of Con-
gress found it necessary to proclaim his loyalty to the nation and to the cause. The atmosphere
carried a strong undercurrent of repression. At one point, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge com-
plained that "I have become a little weary of having Sens get up here and say to those of us who
happen to think a word had better be changed" that "we are trying to shelter treason." Cong
Rec, 65th Cong, 2d Sess, in 56 Cong Rec S 4783 (Apr 8,1918). Similarly, after declaring his oppo-
sition to the 1918 Act, Senator Johnson of California observed that "what has transpired again
and again" both "in this Chamber" and "all over this land" is that "any man who did not sub-
scribe instanter to any doctrine, however subversive of this Republic and of its fundamental
principles," has by "that very token" been charged with "disloyalty." Cong Rec, 65th Cong, 2d
Sess, in 56 Cong Rec S 4566 (Apr 4, 1918). On the government war propaganda, see Murphy,
World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States at 107-12 (cited in note 7) (de-
tailing government efforts to vilify Germany and to convince the public that civil rights restric-
tions were permissible during hostilities); Meirion Harries and Susan Harries, The Last Days of
Innocence:America at War 1917-1918 282-308 (Random House 1997).
96 Professor Ernst Freund of The University of Chicago Law School anticipated this ap-
proach a decade before Masses. See Ernst Freund, The Police Power: Public Policy and Constitu-
tional Rights §§ 474-77 at 508-12 (Callaghan 1904) (citing examples in Illinois and New York
courts in which defendants were acquitted of seditious acts because their speech was not proven
to effect incitement, and speech in the absence of effected incitement was "deemed insufficient
to support a criminal prosecution").
97 Thomas A. Lawrence, Eclipse of Liberty: Civil Liberties in the United States During the
First World War, 21 Wayne L Rev 33, 70 (1974) (describing the "rabid" judiciary in the First-
World-War era).
Judge Hand and the Espionage Act of 1917
conduct was found to be in violation of the prohibitions" of the Es-
pionage Act 1917 "was ... judicial, not legislative in creation.'' "
These judges were operating in a feverish atmosphere, not the
most conducive to careful judicial reflection. Too often, they gave in to
the pressures of the time and to their own fears and distaste for "dis-
loyalty."
Not so Judge Hand. As he so presciently wrote his wife, Frances,
when he was assigned the case, "there are times when the old bunk
about an independent and fearless judiciary means a good deal."" And
so it does.
My thesis in this Essay is not that Judge Hand's "express advo-
cacy" interpretation of the Espionage Act was necessarily "right." That
is an argument for another day."' It is, rather, more modestly, that
Judge Hand was "right" in understanding that in enacting the Espio-
nage Act of 1917 Congress did not commit the nation to the course of
suppression it followed. That was a choice made by the Wilson admini-
stration and our federal judges.
Of course, Judge Hand's opinion in Masses was promptly and
emphatically reversed by the court of appeals.'°1 Judge Hand was
passed over for promotion, which went "to a more political, less dis-
tinguished" judge.'O Judge Hand reflected later that "the case cost me
something, at least at the time," but "I have been very happy to do
what I believe was some service to temperateness and sanity."'' 3
The circulation of The Masses dropped precipitously because
without mailing privileges it was unable to reach most of its audience.
A few days after the decision of the court of appeals upholding the
order of the Postmaster, the government indicted seven of The
98 O'Brian, 42 Rep NY St Bar Assn at 301 (cited in note 4).
99 Gunther, Learned Hand at 155 (cited in note 26).
100 See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Origins of the "Bad Tendency" Test. Free Speech in Wartime,
2002 Sup Ct Rev (forthcoming) (arguing that Judge Hand's interpretation of the Act was more
consistent with the common law of attempts than the prevailing judicial interpretation of the
Act). It is also noteworthy that the amendments to the original draft of the nonmailability provi-
sion focused expressly on "matter[s] advocating or urging treason, insurrection or forcible resis-
tance to any law of the United States." Thus, where Congress paid specific attention to this issue
it adopted a formulation that tracked the express advocacy standard. Even if the prevailing judi-
cial interpretation of the 1917 Act went well beyond the intent or expectations of Congress in
suppressing dissent, Judge Hand's emphasis on express incitement was not the only alternative.
Courts might, for example, have insisted on a closer connection between speech and harm, or
they might have insisted on a clearer showing of specific intent to encourage unlawful conduct.
Any of these approaches-focusing on express incitement, harm, or specific intent-would have
been consistent with the language of the Act and the intent of Congress, without quite so broadly
stifling dissent.
101 Masses Publishing Co v Patten, 246 F 24 (2d Cir 1917).
102 Gunther, Learned Hand at 161 (cited in note 26) (noting that Judge Martin T. Manton
received a vacant spot on the Second Circuit).
103 Id (quoting a letter from Judge Hand to C.C. Burlingham).
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Masses's editors and staff for conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act.
By the end of the year, The Masses was out of business."4
104 The indictment of the editors and staff of The Masses was encouraged by the court of
appeals. See Court Finds Masses Unfit to be Mailed, NY Times 10 (Nov 3, 1917) (noting that the
Second Circuit's decision "clears the way for any criminal action the Department of Justice may
wish to take"); Seditious Editors Now Fear Prison, NY Times 17 (Nov 4, 1917) (noting that the
Masses decision spread "[gjreat alarm ... among publishers and editors"). Immediately after the
court of appeals "sustained the action of the postal authority," the "government prosecutor laid
the facts before the Grand Jury." Indicts The Masses and 7 of its Staff, NY Times 4 (Nov 20,1917).
Among those indicted were Max Eastman, John Reed, Josephine Bell, and Henry Glinkerkamp.
See id. The Masses defendants were tried twice. Each trial ended in a hung jury. See Gunther,
Learned Hand at 152 (cited in note 26) (detailing the ultimate demise of The Masses).
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